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Transmission of 
Inflation Afloat 
Michael R. Darby and James R. Lothian 
Almost eleven years ago to the day, Anna Schwartz and we began a 
detailed study of inflation under the Bretton Woods system and in the 
years that immediately followed its breakdown. At the time, the con- 
sensus among economists and in a sizable portion of the financial com- 
munity was that floating exchange rates, though perhaps not a panacea, 
certainly were to be welcomed rather than avoided.  The conclusions 
we reached were very much in accord with that line of  reasoning. The 
United States-the  reserve currency country under Bretton Woods- 
embarked on a policy of  generally accelerating monetary expansion. 
The fixed exchange rates in force under the system facilitated the spread 
of the inflation that resulted. 
The actual transmission of inflation, however, was a drawn out pro- 
cess, not the quick adjustment period envisioned in  many of  the the- 
oretical models. In summarizing the results of the research carried out 
under  the project,  we  characterized  the process as one of  “lagged 
adjustment to lagged adjustment”  (Darby and Lothian  1983, 510). 
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Anna, in her historical overview of the period (1983, 25),  pointed to 
the reason why: 
A variety  of measures, adopted in  countries with  over- or under- 
valued currencies to stave off devaluation  or revaluation,  affected 
the channels of international transmission of price change. Surplus 
countries tried  to avoid price increases, deficit countries price de- 
cline, both as external consequences of their balance-of-payments 
positions. Intermittently, depending on cyclical conditions, countries 
in both categories took steps to right payments imbalances. 
She went on to conclude that if  Bretton Woods was not  a textbook- 
type example of a fixed exchange rate world, neither was the period 
that followed a classic example of a floating exchange rate world. In- 
stead, “it was a managed system, with substantial official intervention 
. . . [in which] countries have continued to hold foreign exchange re- 
serves” (1983, 44). 
Now, as  doubts about the efficacy of floating rates continue to  mount, 
we return, so to speak, to the scene of the crime, not to begin a new 
project on international transmission  with Anna but to present some 
further evidence on the subject.  We  examine the behavior of policy 
variables and other important economic variables across a sample of 
twenty OECD countries under both exchange rate regimes, and derive 
a series of test equations to evaluate the extent of the long-run differ- 
ences in monetary policy behavior between the two systems. We  then 
go on to  examine the correspondence between shorter-term movements 
in economic variables in the various countries under the two systems. 
We  conclude with a discussion of policymakers’ reaction functions. 
The results of the longer-term analysis are clear-cut: Policymakers 
gained a considerably greater degree of long-run independence under 
floating rates. The cross-country variability of nominal variables-av- 
erage rates of inflation, of monetary growth, and of interest-generally 
increased dramatically under floating rates. Moreover, the relationship 
between nominal money stocks and other variables in these countries 
changed in the way that one would expect given long-run policy  in- 
dependence under floating rates. 
The results  of the examination of  shorter-term behavior are more 
mixed.  Nevertheless, they do not  support the notion that short-run 
linkages  common to fixed  rates remained  fully intact  under floating 
rates. Over such time frames, too, there appear to  have been important 
changes. To the extent that these linkages  have remained  the same, 
moreover, one important reason is the tendency for the monetary au- 
thorities of various countries to react in the same way to developments 
abroad. In a number of important instances, their attempts to maintain 205  The International Transmission of  Inflation Afloat 
exchange-rate and  interest-rate stability appear to have  served as a 
continued channel of monetary transmission from the United States. 
5.1  Theoretical Considerations 
To  illustrate the potential  differences in  economic behavior under 
regimes of fixed and floating exchange rates, let us begin by considering 
a simple two-country quantity theoretic model. Such a model is implicit 
in Friedman’s (1953) well-known defense of floating rates. It forms the 
nucleus of the monetary approach to the balance of payments advanced 
by Harry G. Johnson and others in the early  1970s, and it underlies 
much of the earlier theorizing on the subject. 
The model, as it pertains to the domestic economy, takes the form 
of a demand for money function, a monetary equilibrium condition, 
and a purchasing power parity relation. 
(1)  m*  = L (y,i,u) + p , 
where m*  is the percentage rate of  growth of the desired quantity of 
nominal cash balances demanded, y  is the percentage  rate of growth 
of real income, i is the rate of change of the nominal rate of interest, 
p  is the rate of inflation, and u is a portmanteau variable included to 
represent other factors such as the degree of financial sophistication. 
(2)  p=p’+e, 
where a prime signifies the reserve-currency country, and e is the per- 
centage change in the exchange rate-the  price in domestic currency 
of a unit of the reserve currency. 
In the fixed exchange rate case, e is zero and p  will take whatever 
value is consistent with p’.  In equilibrium, the growth rate of the nom- 
inal quantity of money supplied will equal the growth rate of the nominal 
quantity of money demanded: 
(3)  m = m*. 
Combining (3) with (1)  and recalling the discussion in connection with 
(2), we have 
(4)  m = L (y,i,u) -  p‘. 
With p’ given, the nominal stock of money is proximately determined 
by the quantity of real cash balances demanded. 
Interest rates in this world of long-run equilibrium and fixed exchange 
rates are assumed to change by the same absolute amount in the domestic 
The demand for money function is of the form 
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economy and in the reserve-currency country. By definition, exchange 
rates are fixed. If they are expected to remain so, then interest parity 
implies equality of levels of  nominal interest rates among countries. 
Note  that  since actual  and anticipated rates of  inflation within each 
country are equal on these assumptions, the Fisher relationship implies 
that real interest rates are also equal in the two countries. 
In a floating exchange rate world, equations (l),  (2), and (3) and the 
reserve-country analogues of  (1) and (3), are combined into a three- 
equation system in which the rate of change of  the exchange rate is 
determined by the difference in the growth rates of the excess supplies 
of  money (m - L)  in  the two countries, and each country’s inflation 
rate is determined by the rate of growth of its excess supply of money 
alone. We  can write these equations as: 
(5)  e  = m - L(y,i,u) - m’ + Lr(yf,ir,u’), 
(6)  P  = m -  L(y,i,u), 
(7) 
Again, these are to be viewed as long-run equilibrium equations. 
Unlike the fixed rate case, there is no necessary connection between 
growth rates of  the  supply of, and the demand  for, money. Money 
supply is a variable determined by domestic policy considerations. An 
increase in  the growth rate of the demand for money with no change 
in the growth of supply would result in a decrease in the rate of inflation. 
Variations in L affect m only if  policymakers choose to stabilize p. 
In further contrast to the fixed rate case, nominal interest rates are 
free to vary among countries. Full interest rate parity is consistent with 
the differences in  the levels of  interest rates equal to the percentage 
rate of increase of  the exchange rate. This independence of nominal 
interest rates does not correspond, of course, to a similar independence 
of real interest rates which may be even more harmonized as the capital- 
control impedimenta of fixed exchange rates have been removed.2 
One of the issues during the Bretton Woods era was how accurately 
equation (4) described the situation faced by a nonreserve country in 
the short run. Put differently, the question of  interest was the degree 
to which a non-reserve-currency country could affect its money supply 
and price level over such periods. There was much less debate as to 
whether such a country could, in the absence of  a change in  the ex- 
change rate, do so in the long run. 
Similar questions have arisen since the advent of floating rates. One 
difference is that in  many of  these discussions, particularly in the fi- 
nancial press, little or no distinction has been made regarding the time 
dimension of the problem. The long run is implicitly viewed as identical 
in  most respects with the short run, with the rise in inflation in the 
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industrialized world near the start of this decade being interpreted as 
evidence of no change in  the transmission  properties of the system. 
Other proponents of  the view that flexible exchange rates have  not 
worked as expected argue that exchange rates have tended to move 
perversely, relative to their purchasing power parity values, and, there- 
fore, have served to transmit fluctuations from one country to another 
rather than to limit their spread, and that via “ratcheting effects” have 
themselves been a cause of inflati~n.~ 
The alternative view is that these intercountry linkages, while per- 
haps important in the short run, have been of little consequence in the 
long run. Central banks, according to this argument, may have followed 
targets of  the interest-rate or exchange-rate variety that reduced their 
degree of short-run monetary control, but those targets were changed 
often enough and by  sufficient amounts that the degree of  long-run 
control was substantial. Purchasing power parity, though not a good 
predictor of exchange rate movements over shorter time periods, held 
tolerably well over longer periods. (See Davutyan and Pippenger 1985, 
and Lothian 1986.) 
One test of these competing sets of hypotheses is to examine the 
long-run variability among countries of money supply growth, of infla- 
tion, and of  interest rates during the two  period^.^  Increases in  the 
variability of all three during the floating rate period are consistent with 
the hypothesis that floating rates have increased the autonomy of the 
various domestic monetary authorities.  If  the variability has not  in- 
creased, however,  it is  difficult to draw any firm conclusion: under 
Bretton Woods, actual exchange rates did change and exchange con- 
trols and the like were used to offset market pressures that otherwise 
would have led  to exchange rate changes.  Policy dependence  may, 
therefore, have been less than complete. Correspondingly, under float- 
ing rates some monetary authorities may have geared their policies to 
maintaining interest rate  equality  with  other countries or may  have 
pursued nearly identical domestic inflation targets. 
Fortunately, there are several ways of distinguishing between these 
two states of the world. If equations like (4)  and (6) present reasonably 
accurate alternative long-run descriptions, then under fixed exchange 
rates we should observe a significant positive one-for-one relationship 
between the quantities of real cash balances demanded and nominal 
cash balances  supplied in  different countries, and under floating ex- 
change rates, little or no relationship. Correspondingly, under fixed 
rates we should observe no relation between the quantity of real cash 
balances demanded and the price level, and under floating rates, a zero 
or negative relation. 
The regression coefficient of real money growth in the regression of 
nominal on real money growth should be unity, and the standard error 208  Michael R. Darby/James R. Lothian 
of estimate for the regression should be relatively low. Under floating 
rates, we should see very nearly the reverse. The regression coefficients 
should be much lower  in value, and zero in the case in which  each 
country’s monetary authorities pursued money supply targets that were 
independent of growth in  the real  quantity of  money demanded. By 
the same token, the standard error of estimate should be much higher, 
reflecting both the lower regression coefficient and the hypothesized 
higher (cross-country) standard deviation of nominal money gr~wth.~ 
The discussion of  interest rate behavior among countries under the 
two regimes also suggests a further relationship that we can exploit. 
Under fixed exchange rates, observed variations in inflation rates among 
countries are likely to be smaller and more heavily dominated by tran- 
sitory elements than under floating rates. Differences in actual inflation 
rates are, therefore, less likely to provide  useful  information  about 
future inflation rates than in a regime of floating exchange rates. As a 
result, the relationship between  average levels of bond yields and of 
inflation  rates is  likely to be  looser under fixed  exchange rates than 
under floating rates. But, as we point out below. this is not the only 
possible  interpretation of  such a  difference  in  the relationship.  Ac- 
cordingly, we place considerably less weight on these results. 
5.2  Empirical Results: Longer-Term Relationships 
The data we use to compare the two regimes are for twenty OECD 
countries over the period  1956 to 1986. For all twenty countries there 
are annual figures for money  supply (MI except for Sweden, where 
data availability dictated using a broader definition),  a cost of living 
index, and real income (GNP or GDP, depending upon the country). 
For a subsample of fourteen countries, data for government bond yields 
are also available. The sources of almost all  of these data were the 
publications and companion computer tapes of the International Mon- 
etary Fund.h 
5.2.  I  Cross-Country Variability 
Evidence on variability  is contained in figures 5.1 and 5.2. Figure 
5.1 is for the entire twenty countries. Figure 5.2 is for the subsample 
of fourteen countries. In both figures we  have  plotted  yearly  cross- 
country standard deviations of rates of monetary growth and of infla- 
ti~n.~  Figure 5.2 also includes a plot of the yearly cross-country stan- 
dard deviations of bond yields. 
Both measures of variability  plotted in figure 5.1 show substantial 
increases beginning in the early  1970s and becoming fully manifest in 
the mid-l970s, with the increase in the variability of the rate of inflation 209  The International Transmission of Inflation Afloat 
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Fig. 5.1  Variability of money growth and inflation; 20 OECD coun- 
tries; 1956- 1986. Source: International Monetary Fund. Note: 
Figures  are  standard  deviations  of  annual  data for  each 
country. 
being particularly dramatic8  Figure 5.2 shows sizable increases in in- 
flation and in interest rate variability at approximately the same time 
as the increases depicted in figure 5.1, but no overall uptrend in the 
variability of actual money supply growth. Taken as  a whole, therefore, 
these data are consistent with the hypothesis that national policies have 
become more autonomous. The one seeming anomaly is the variability 
of money supply growth under the floating exchange rate regime in the 
subsample. Further evidence on this issue, and on the variability ques- 
tion in general, is presented in table 5.1. 
In this table we list standard deviations of country-average data for 
both the fixed rate and floating rate periods in their entire tie^.^ These 
standard deviations  were  computed for the variables  shown in  the 
figures and for three additional variables-real  income growth, growth 
in the excess supply of  MI, and real M1 growth. The excess supply of 
money variable was defined as  the difference between actual M1 growth 
and  the estimated rate of  growth  of the real quantity  of money  de- 
manded.'O The fixed rate period encompassed the years 1956-73;  the 210  Michael R.  Darby/James R. Lothian 
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Variability of  money growth, inflation, and bond yields;  14 
OECD countries; 1956-86.  Source: International Monetary 
Fund. Note: Figures are standard deviations of  annual data 
for each country. 
Economic Variability under Fixed and Floating Exchange Rates, 
1956 to 1986 
Twenty Countries  Fourteen Countries 
Fixed  Floating  Fixed  Floating 
Standard deviation of 
M1 growth  0.038  0.060  0.036  0.031 
Inflation  0.014  0.067  0.008  0.028 
Bond yields  N.A.  N.A.  0.010  0.027 
Excess M1 growth  0.022  0.065  0.019  0.035 
Real M1 growth  0.032  0.022  0.033  0.017 
Correlation of 
M1, real MI growth  0.929  0.142  0.978  0.469 
Real income growth  0.014  0.009  0.015  0.010 
Notes: Standard deviations are of country averages of annual data for the periods  1956- 
73 and 1974-86,  respectively. Rates of growth were computed as changes in the loga- 
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floating rate period, the years 1974-86.  Table 5.1 also lists the corre- 
lation coefficient across countries for nominal and real money growth. 
With the exception of M1 growth in the smaller sample, all of the 
nominal variables shown in the figures-M1  growth, bond yields, and 
inflation-show  a marked increase in variability  in  the floating rate 
period. By way of contrast, real income growth becomes less variable 
in both samples under floating rates. We  believe that this reduction in 
cross-country variability of real output growth reflects a natural con- 
vergence  as the postwar recoveries previously  added different mag- 
nitudes  to normal  growth rates according to the relative  extent of 
destruction suffered. 
As real output growth rates converge, so do our implied estimates 
of growth in real money demand. Over such substantial periods our 
estimates of the real quantity of money demanded do not differ sub- 
stantially from the actual growth in real money;  this explains  the decline 
in variability of real MI growth for both samples in the floating versus 
the fixed periods. 
It seems paradoxical that the variability of inflation goes up sharply 
in the smaller sample even though variability  of M1 growth actually 
declines.  One way  to look  at this phenomenon is  to note that the 
variability in excess M1 growth-the  difference between nominal M1 
growth  and  our estimate of  the growth  of  the real quantity  of  MI 
demanded-increases. 
Another way to analyze it is in terms of the usual formula for the 
variance of an algebraic sum: By definition, inflation is the difference 
between nominal and real money growth. Hence the variance of infla- 
tion is the sum of the variances in nominal and real MI growth minus 
twice their covariance. In the fourteen-country sample, the sum com- 
ponent must decrease since both variances individually decrease. The 
increase in the variance of inflation is a result of the offsetting covari- 
ance term falling  much  more sharply,  as the correlation  coefficient 
between nominal and real money falls from approximately unity to less 
than half. An even sharper fall is evident in the twenty-country sample. 
We  interpret this as showing that in the long run, under fixed ex- 
change rates, foreign monetary authorities did not vary money growth 
substantially from that required by growth in real  money and world 
prices. That is, neither revaluations nor measurement problems caused 
substantial variations among inflation rates, and the monetary author- 
ities allowed nominal money growth to reflect differences in real money 
growth . 
Under floating exchange rates, nominal  money growth  appears to 
have been chosen largely  independently  of variations  in  real  money 
demand. In one sense, this independence (especially apparent for the 212  Michael R. DarbyIJames R.  Lothian 
twenty countries) is surprising since it suggests that foreign monetary 
authorities have selected nominal money targets with inflation being a 
residual,  rather than  selecting  target  trend  inflation  rates  and  then 
choosing M1 growth trends which would achieve those targets. We turn 
next to further evidence in support of this interpretation. 
5.2.2  Real Money Growth, Nominal Money Growth, and Inflation 
Table 5.2 lists summary statistics from regressions of money supply 
growth and inflation  on the growth of real  money balances  for both 
samples.  ‘1 For the fixed rate period we see that cross-country differ- 
ences in trend growth rates of nominal money supply are essentially 
explained one-for-one by differences in growth in real cash balances 
in both cases. The R2’s  are 0.86  and 0.95 in the large and small samples, 
respectively, and the regression coefficients have values insignificantly 
different from one. For the floating rate period, in contrast, the R2’s 
are low, the standard errors considerably higher, and the regression 
coefficients are not significantly different from zero at the 0.95 level. 
Now, turn to the duals of the above relationships, the regressions of 
inflation on real  cash balances.  During the fixed rate period, as the 
theory suggests,  we observe no significant relationship  between the 
two variables.  During the floating rate period, we  observe negative 
relationships between the two-again,  as the theory suggests, provided 
Table 5.2  Regressions of Money Growth and Inflation on Real Money 
Growth for Country-Average Data 
~ 
Dependent Variable  Period  Constant  m -P  RZ  SEE 
20  Countries 
m  1956-73  0.037  1.102  0.856  0.014 
P  1956-73  0.037  0.102  0.001  0.014 
m  1974-86  0.110  -0.381  0.034  0.061 
P  1974-86  0.110  -  1.381  0.168  0.061 
(6.315)  10.658 
(6.315)  0.989 
(7.956)  (0.607) 
(7.956)  (-2,200) 
14 Countries 
m  1956-73  0.035 
P  1956-73  0.035 
m  1974-86  0.081 





1.067  0.953  0.008 
(1 6.239) 
0.067  0.003  0.008 
(1.018) 
0.832  0.155  0.028 
(1.838) 
(0.371) 
-0.168  -0.071  0.028 
Note: Absolute values of t-statistics are beneath the coefficients in parentheses. 213  The International Transmission of Inflation Afloat 
that monetary authorities switch from an exchange rate to a money 
growth policy. For the larger sample, this negative relationship is sta- 
tistically significant; for the smaller, it is not. 
One additional point about these results that deserves mention is the 
problem of measurement error. One set of regressions related nominal 
M1  growth to real  M1  growth-the  difference between  nominal M1 
growth and inflation. The other related inflation to real  M1  growth. 
Measurement errors in nominal money will, therefore, bias the coef- 
ficient in a regression of nominal money growth on real money growth 
toward 1.0. Measurement errors in prices will bias the coefficient in a 
regression of inflation on real money growth toward -  1  .O. 
Bias, however, does not appear to be the explanation for the differ- 
ences that we actually observe between the two periods. To see this, 
consider the  situation in  which both  m  and p  contain measurement 
errors. In this instance, the estimated coefficient will  be a weighted 
average of the true coefficient, and the ratio of  the error in nominal 
money growth to the sum of that error and the error in inflation. The 
weights, respectively, will be the share of the variance of the true value 
of m -  p  in its total variance (including both types of error) and one 
minus that share.I2 
Suppose that in each period the true value of the coefficient in the 
relation linking nominal and real money growth rates is zero, that is, 
in both periods monetary authorities determine nominal money growth 
without regard to its inflationary implications. To obtain our estimates 
of near unity and close to zero, the variance in the measurement error 
of nominal money would have to almost completely dominate the total 
variance of real cash balances under fixed rates, and be an exceedingly 
small fraction of the total variance under floating rates. The total vari- 
ance, however, fell from the one period to the next. The variance of 
the measurement error would, therefore, have to fall by a multiple- 
close to two, in the case of the full sample, and five, in the case of the 
smaller sample-f  the decline in  the total  variance. This is  totally 
implausible. 
Alternatively, suppose that the true coefficient is unity in  both in- 
stances, that both regimes behave like the classic fixed rate model. To 
produce our pattern of  estimates, two things would have to happen. 
The decline in  the variance of  real money growth would have to be 
due totally to a decline in the systematic portion of the variance. At 
the same time, the ratio of the variance of the error in nominal money 
to the sum of  the errors in prices and nominal money would have to 
become exceedingly small. Both developments, the latter particularly, 
appear unlikely. By  themselves, therefore, measurement errors do not 
appear capable of accounting for the overall pattern of estimates that 
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5.2.3  Bond Yields 
In table 5.3, we report estimates separately for each period of the 
relationships between the average level of bond yields in each country 
and both the average rate of money growth  and the average rate of 
inflation. For the fixed rate period there is a positive, but statistically 
insignificant, relationship between bond yields and inflation, and a pos- 
itive and barely significant relationship between bond yields and money 
growth. For the floating rate period, in contrast, both relationships are 
highly significant. 
These results are consistent with the explanation advanced earlier 
that revolves around differences in the conduct of policy and hence in 
the longer-term inflation process under the two exchange rate regimes. 
With completely fixed exchange rates, intercountry differences in rates 
of inflation  will  be transitory. Permanent  differences require continu- 
ously changing exchange rates. Under floating exchange rates, inter- 
country inflation differentials can exist indefinitely. Hence, the distinction 
between permanent and  transitory components of  the  inflation  rate 
becomes less relevant. Provided that there were no other factors which 
changed  between the two periods  and  which  affected  the ability  of 
current and past rates of inflation and monetary growth to proxy an- 
ticipated future rates of inflation, we can view the estimated relation- 
ships as a further indication  of the essential differences between the 
two regimes. 
One factor that, in  principle,  could  be important is  the generally 
greater variability  of  nominal  variables  under floating  rates.  In the 
presence of measurement errors, this would produce higher correla- 
tions during that period. In practice, however, this cannot be the full 
explanation since variations in money growth across the fourteen coun- 
tries do not increase, yet the correlation  of money growth and bond 
yields does. 
Table 5.3  Regressions of Bond Yields on Inflation and Money Growth for 
Country-Average Data 
- 
Period  Constant  m  P  R2  SEE 
1956-73  0.050 
(8.025) 
1956-73  0.041 
(3.105) 
1974-86  0.037 
(3.250) 
1974-86  0.037 
(3.240) 
0.130  0.155  0.010 
(1.842) 
0.506  0.087  0.010 
(I .496) 
0.772  0.770  0.013 
(6.665) 
0.854  0.742  0.014 
(6.190) 
Notes: The dependent variable was the level of government bond yields, expressed as 
a decimal. Absolute values of 1-statistics are beneath the coefficients in parentheses. 215  The International Transmission of Inflation Afloat 
Another possible explanation for these results is that there was sim- 
ply a very long adjustment lag. Market participants, for whatever rea- 
son, adjusted extremely slowly to high and rising inflation. Consequently, 
during the fixed rate period when inflation first started its worldwide 
rise, bond yields remained relatively low. Only as  the process continued 
into the floating rate era did the adjustment, including necessary in- 
stitutional and regulatory changes, become more complete. While a lag 
of this length seems somewhat implausible, this explanation cannot be 
ruled out. 
5.3  Empirical Results: Shorter-Term Relationships 
The long-run relationships appear to have changed in a way that is 
consistent with the simple theoretical analysis, although we were sur- 
prised by the lack of stronger  evidence that central bank nominal money 
targets were influenced by their inflationary implications. Now we pre- 
sent evidence of several sorts on the short-run links among the coun- 
tries and how they fared with the change in the exchange rate regime. 
5.3.1 
of annual regressions of the form 
Relationships Between U.S. and Foreign Variables 
This evidence is summarized in a series of tables reporting the results 
xi  = a  + bx,,, 
where xi  is variable x in country i and xu, is its counterpart in the United 
States. The variables were alternatively nominal M1 growth, real MI 
growth, inflation, real output growth, and the level of the government 
bond yield. In each instance, the regressions  were run with contem- 
poraneous values of the variables for both the fixed and floating periods 
as defined above. There was also some experimentation with lags and 
with different time periods. Tables 5.4 through 5.8 contain the results 
of these regressions. 
At first glance, these results appear to run totally counter to those 
already presented. They seem to imply less independence, rather than 
more, under floating. Consider the inflation rate comparisons reported 
in table 5.4. 
Under floating rates, the correlation between U.S.  and foreign infla- 
tion rates is actually higher. This is true on average and for a sizable 
number of cases viewed individually. In going from fixed to floating, 
the median  R2 for these regressions  rises from 0.21 to 0.28.  Corre- 
spondingly,  in  14  of the  19  individual  inflation comparisons, the R2 
either rises or stays very nearly constant. Viewed from this perspective, 
inflation rates appear to have been more similar across countries under 
floating rates. Table 5.4  Regressions of Foreign on U.S.  Inflation 
1956 to 1973  1974 to 1986 
-  - 
































































1.06  0.075 
(4.031) 
1.02  0.026 
(2.144) 
0.71  0.045 
(2.331) 
0.90  0.033 
(3.099) 
1.15  0.037 
(3.325) 
1.17  0.052 
(2.395) 
2.41  0.042 
(3.616) 
0.51  0.008 
(0.983) 
0.97  0.153 
(5.380) 
0.325  0.06 
(1.337) 
0.380  0.28 
(2.379) 
0.355  0.08 
(1.417) 
0.661  0.65 
(4.783) 
0.737  0.68 
(5.104) 
0.659  0.27 
(2.314) 
0.743  0.66 
(4.896) 
0.446  0.56 
(4.038) 
(0.823) 




































































0.03  0.0247 
0.15  0.0256 
0.33  0.0189 
0.28  0.0197 
0.53  0.0181 
-0.05  0.0348 
0.21  0.0155 
0.23  0.0188 
-0.02  0.0668 

















































































Note:  The symbols a and b represent the intercept and slope coefficient; t-statistics are beneath in parentheses. Table 5.5  Regressions of Foreign on U.S.  Money Growth 
1956 to 1973  1974 to 1986 
-  - 



































































































-  0.145 
(0.176) 
~  1.535 
(2.056) 
-  I .296 





-  0.09 
-  0.09 
-0.06 
0.09 
-  0.09 
0.21 
0.62 










































































0.1  1 
0.33 
0.02 



















































0.526  -0.05 
(0.652) 
0.732  0.12 
(1.632) 
-0.209  -0.07 
-0.224  -0.07 
-0.366  -0.06 
-  1.319  0.07 
-0.132  -0.08 
-0.346  -0.02 





















Note: The symbols a and h represent the intercept and slope coefficients: t-statistics are beneath in parentheses. Table 5.6  Regressions of  Foreign on U.S. Bond Yields 
1956 to 1973  1974 to 1986 
-  - 
Country  U  h  R2  SEE  DW  U  h  R2  SEE  DW 
Australia 


































































































































































































~  ~  ~ 
Note  The symbols u and h represent the intercept and slope coefficients, t-statistics are beneath in parentheses. Table 5.7  Regressions of  Foreign on U.S. Real Money Growth 
1956 to 1973  1974 to 1986 
-  - 


























































-  0.04 
0.04 
-0.01 



























































-  0.290 
-0.333 





























1.13 Table 5.7  (continued) 
1956 to 1973  1974 to 1986 
Country  U 
Japan  0.116 
(7.052) 
Netherlands  0.016 
(1.5 15) 
Norway  0.027 
(3.192) 
Portugal  0.049 
(3.604) 
Spain  0.063 
(4.880) 
Sweden  0.030 
(4.401) 
Switzerland  0.037 
(2.623) 
Turkey  0.072 
(4.169) 
(0.671) 























-  0.06 
0.00 
0.19 






































-  0.01  1 
(0.296) 

















































Note: The symbols u and b represent the intercept and slope coefficients; r-statistics are beneath in parentheses. Table 5.8  Regressions of  Foreign on U.S. Real Income Growth 
1956 to 1973  1974 to 1986 
-  - 
































0.372  0.04 
(1.317) 





0.094  -0.06 
(0.197) 
0.232  0.11 
(1.756) 




0.115  -0.05 
0.640  0.32 
0.444  0.15 
-0.063  -0.06 
-0.129  -0.05 
0.0231  1.91 
0.0181  2.32 
0.0200  1.24 
0.0173  1.75 
0.0183  2.49 
0.0389  1.41 
0.0108  2.08 
0.0346  1.81 
0.0242  2.39 






































































2.49 Table 5.8  (continued) 
1956 to 1973  1974 to  1986 
-  - 
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Note: the symbols a and h represent the intercept and slope coefficients; r-statistics are beneath in parentheses. 225  The International Transmission of Inflation Afloat 
The inference, however, does not follow. Underlying it is a common 
confusion, confusion between a ratio and an absolute amount. The R* 
is, so to speak, the proportion of the glass that is full. The R2 tells us 
very little when the size of the glass-the  variability of the dependent 
variable and hence the total sum of squares, the denominator of  the 
ratio-has  changed. 
This is the case throughout our sample. Temporal variations in  in- 
flation, nominal money growth, and bond yields in  the United States 
and most foreign economies were generally much greater in the floating 
rate period than in the fixed. A higher R2 can, therefore, be consistent 
with more residual variation and more slack in the relationships under 
floating rates-the  empty portion of the glass being larger-or the con- 
verse.I3 What we want to look at instead are direct measures of  the 
slack, the standard errors of estimate of the regressions. In most cases, 
these are substantially greater during the floating rate period. The me- 
dian for the inflation rate  regressions  is 0.025 under floating versus 
0.019 under fixed. In the individual inflation regressions, we  see in- 
creases in  14 of the 19 instances. 
Very much the same thing holds for nominal money growth and for 
bond  yields-increases  in  the median standard errors in going from 
fixed to floating (from 0.044 to 0.053 for money; from 0.005 to 0.014 
for yields) and in the standard errors of most of the relationships viewed 
individually (15 of  19 for money; 12 of  13 for yields). Two major dif- 
ferences between  these  relationships  and those for inflation are the 
much lower correlations in both periods for money, and the declining, 
but still high, second-period correlations for yields. Another is the much 
larger residual variability in the money relationships than in the other 
two sets of relationships. 
Comparing one period with the other, we see a pattern in the real 
money regressions largely similar to those described for the three nom- 
inal variables. Standard errors under floating are generally much higher 
than under fixed. Median figures are 0.047 and 0.065, respectively, and 
in only four individual instances (Belgium, France, Japan, and Spain) 
do we see a decline. At the same time, however, the R2’s in several of 
these regressions are higher under floating than in the comparable nom- 
inal money regressions, and in five of these cases there is a statistically 
significant relationship at close to, or better than, the 0.95 level. Canada 
and the United Kingdom, in particular, stand out. For both countries, 
we see an approximate one-to-one relationship with the United States 
under floating. The close, long-term correspondence  of  velocity be- 
havior documented by Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz (1982) for 
the United States and the United Kingdom has therefore continued to 
hold. Canada, evidently, has also become part of the process. 226  Michael R. Darby/James R. Lothian 
The real  money  regressions, thus, point  to some continued  non- 
monetary transmission abroad from the United States under floating, 
while the bond-yield regressions point to capital-market transmission 
in  particular,  but those channels apparently were neither ubiquitous 
nor dominant.  l4  Noticeably absent under both exchange rate regimes 
are the significant negative relationships between U.S. and foreign real 
money growth that would signal currency substitution as suggested in 
Brittain (1981). 
The closest we come to observing stronger relationships under float- 
ing are those reported in table 5.8 for real income growth. Standard 
errors of  estimate on average decline under floating (from a median 
figure of  0.022 to one of 0.017), are lower or approximately the same 
in over half of the individual comparisons, and decline markedly in the 
case of Austria, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, and Spain. And in 
the first four instances, as well as in the cases of Canada, Norway, and 
the United  Kingdom,  the R2 is also noticeably  higher.  In the other 
countries, no similar tendencies are apparent.  Is 
This last set of results is not inconsistent with the theoretical prop- 
osition of increased  independence under floating. The independence 
posited by theory is of nominal magnitudes rather than real magnitudes. 
To the extent that floating is accompanied by removal of barriers to 
trade and investment, international interdependence of real variables 
could increase. 
In addition to removal of such barriers, two other real factors that 
could be influencing the real-income results is the convergence of trend 
real growth rates noted above and common oil-price shocks. Neither, 
however,  can completely explain the results.  Other comparisons we 
have made using first differences of real growth rates produce largely 
similar results to these reported for the growth rates themselves; al- 
though such differencing should largely eliminate trend effects. By the 
same token, oil-price  shocks should have affected all of the relation- 
ships. This is obviously not the case. 
The other possibility is that monetary factors are playing a role here, 
that domestic monetary policy remains linked under floating exchange 
rates-albeit  less loosely  over the longer run and to greatly varying 
degrees among countries-and  that common monetary shocks in many 
countries have led to common real fluctuation. We explore this question 
further immediately below. 
5.3.2  Monetary Authorities’ Reaction Functions 
The weight of the evidence in the Znternational Transmission volume 
supported the view that foreign monetary authorities exercised con- 
siderable  short-run monetary  control under both fixed and (the then 
new) floating exchange rates. The long-run harmonization of inflation 227  The International Transmission of Inflation Afloat 
rates documented in  section  5.2 above came about because of  the 
persistent pressures of reserve flows on money growth whenever price- 
level  divergences became significant.  Such a  Humean  reserve-flow 
mechanism worked slowly and with  lags, but the cumulative effects 
were clearly overwhelming in the long run. Since monetary authorities 
have been neither maintaining a clean float nor totally eschewing in- 
tervention, an interesting issue is whether this Humean reserve-flow 
channel still leads to international transmission of monetary impulses. 
The question is  whether or not  the effects  on the money  supply of 
official intervention are sterilized. 
We address this question here, as in Znternational Transmission, by 
examining whether reserve flows scaled by high-powered money have 
a significantly positive effect on money growth in a reaction function 
which also allows for response to inflation and the pace of economic 
growth. We  had hoped to analyze it analogously to the approach fol- 
lowed in the earlier volume, to apply a consistent functional form to 
quarterly data for each country in the period since 1974. Unfortunately, 
we soon confronted data and modelling problems nearly as severe as 
those reported in the earlier study. Rather than take on that task at 
this juncture, and without  the good counsel  of Anna and our other 
colleagues, we instead report some exploratory results which we trust 
will be persuasive as to the value of pursuing these issues further. 
Table 5.9 summarizes the results of what Leamer (1978) has termed 
specification  searches for the thirteen countries for which  quarterly 
data were available.  A variety of lag structures were examined in an 
attempt to find a compact, minimal  standard error of estimate repre- 
sentation  of the data. Significance levels must, therefore, be viewed 
with  considerable  skepticism.  For  11 of  the  13  countries, plausible 
reaction  functions were estimated in which monetary authorities  tighten 
if real output or prices grow rapidly and do  not fully sterilize the effects 
of intervention on money growth, at least in the long run. The Aus- 
tralian and French equations were not successfully fitted. 
The results suggest that exchange-market  intervention has continued 
to provide  some degree of monetary  linkage among these countries. 
The greater variability of inflation across countries since 1973 appar- 
ently reflects  the quantitatively greater importance of money-growth 
versus exchange-rate goals, not the complete elimination of Humean 
reserve flows due to the exclusive pursuit of sterilized intervention. A 
surprising result is the apparent influence of reserve changes on Amer- 
ican money growth. This differs sharply from the results reported in 
chapter 16 of our 1983 volume. 
The difference is evidently due to our inclusion here of data for the 
latter part of the 1970s and for 1980. One of the major factors-perhaps 
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-  2.73 
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-2.31 




-  1.35 
(1.92) 
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-0.88 
-  3.03 
-  1.11 
-0.99 
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1.73 Source: IMF, International Financial Starisrics. 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are absolute values of r-statistics. All regressions were run using the Cochrane- 
Orcutt method to take account of first-order autocorrelation. The dependent variable was the change in the 
logarithm of MI. The symbols rlh, YT,  and p  represent the three independent variables: scaled reserves-the 
ratio of the change in the level of central bank holdings of foreign reserves to the level of high-powered money 
at the start of the period; (transitory) real income growth-the  difference between the change in the logarithm 
of real GNP and the slope coefficient from a regression of logarithm of real GNP on time during the previous 
twenty quarters; and inflation-the  change in the logarithm of the cost of living index. The specific variants 
of all three were determined empirically for each country separately and took the forms noted below. 
Austria:  rlh was the sum of lags 0 to 11 constrained to a uniform distribution; yT was the sum of lags  1 to 3 
constrained to a uniform distribution; p  was the sum of lags 2 and 3. 
Australia:  rlh  was the contemporaneous  value; YT  was the sum of  lags  I  to 20  constrained to a  Pascal 
distribution; p was lag 2. 
Canada: rlh was the sum of lags 0 to 20 constrained to a Pascal distribution; YT was the sum of lags 2 to 5 
constrained to a first-degree polynomial with a tail constraint;  p was the sum of lags 2 to 5 constrained 
to a first-degree polynomial with a tail constraint. 
Finland:  rlh was the surn of lags 0 to 20 constrained to a Pascal distribution; yT was the sum of lags 3 to 6 
constrained to a uniform distribution; p was lag 3. 
France: rlh was lag 2;  JJT was the surn of lags 0 to 12 constrained to a Pascal distribution; p was lag 3. 
Germany: rlh and yT were the sums of lags 0 to 20 constrained to a Pascal distribution; p was the contem- 
Italy:  rlh was the sum  of lags 0 to 12 constrained to a first-degree polynomial; YT was the sum of lags 0 to 8 
Japan:  rlh and YT were the sums of lags 0 to 20 constrained to a Pascal distribution; p  was lag  1. 
Spain:  rlh was the contemporaneous value; y~ was the sum of lags 0 to 16 constrained to a Pascal distribution; 
Sweden. rlh was the sum of lags 0 to 20 constrained to a Pascal distribution; yT was the sum of lags 4 to 6; p 
Switzerland:  rlh was the sum of lags 0  to 20 and YT the sum of  lags 0 to 12, both constrained to Pascal 
United Kingdom:  rlh was the contemporaneous value; yT was the sum of lags 2 to 5 constrained to a uniform 
United  States: rlh was lag 2;  YT was the sum of lags 0 to 20 constrained to a Pascal distribution; p was lag 3. 
poraneous value. 
constrained to a first-degree polynomial; p was lag  1. 
p was lag 4. 
was lag 2. 
distributions; p  was the contemporaneous value. 
distribution; p  was lag 3. 230  Michael R. Darby/James R. Lothian 
the combination of a falling dollar, a balance of payments deficit, and 
resultant pressures from policymakers abroad. When the impact of a 
change in reserves is allowed to vary between the intensive intervention 
period (defined as 1978 fourth quarter to 1981 first quarter) and the 
rest of the period, only the intervention-period effect appears to matter. 
The separate coefficients estimated in a regression that is otherwise 
nearly identical to the one reported in table 5.9 for the United States 
was  1.29 with a t  value of 2.99 for scaled reserves during the inter- 
vention period, and 0.18 with a t  value of  0.59 for the same variable 
during the remainder of the period. 
5.4  Conclusions 
The principal finding of this paper is that flexible exchange rates have 
indeed been accompanied by greater long-run monetary policy inde- 
pendence. Across the sample of twenty OECD countries that we have 
examined, nominal variables  have behaved differently under flexible 
exchange rates than under fixed. The differences, moreover, are exactly 
the sort that theory suggests under the two regimes. 
Inflation rates, nominal bond yields, and monetary policy became 
more variable under floating rates, and the positive, longer-term covari- 
ance between nominal and real rates of  money growth that was nec- 
essarily a hallmark of the fixed rate system became weak or virtually 
nonexistent. 
This does not mean, however, that we interpret our findings as in- 
dicating that the world became less interdependent across the board 
or that policymakers in one country actually operated without regard 
to policy and other developments abroad. On the contrary, both actual 
observation of what went on in this period and a number of the empirical 
findings reported in the paper-most  notably the continued substantial 
or rising correlations between  bond  yields in the  United  States and 
abroad, and the apparent continued  relationship between  the scaled 
balance of payments and monetary growth in most major countries- 
suggest that interdependence of capital markets, in particular, increased 
and that central bankers often hesitated to go it completely alone. The 
Humean monetary channel of transmission, though greatly weakened, 
did  not  entirely  cease  to  exist,  while  other  channels  may  have 
strengthened. 
If  long-run independence increased, then  how can we explain the 
two waves of inflation that shook most of  the industrialized world in 
the middle and late 1970s, as well as the disinflation and now apparently 
increasing inflation in many countries during this decade? 
The first episode of inflation, as our earlier work with Anna Schwartz 
indicated, is best understood as a lagged response to coordinated ex- 
pansive monetary policies in place under Bretton Woods, with the initial 231  The International Transmission of Inflation Afloat 
oil-price shock lending a helping hand. The second bout, we believe, can 
be explained by vestiges of the same type of process. Policymakers, ac- 
cording to our results, in most instances continued to react to balance- 
of-payments inflows and outflows. In many instances, too, the desire 
for stability of either interest rates or exchange rates, and sometimes 
both, continued to exert a powerful attraction. Central bankers’ reac- 
tions evidently were much more sporadic, and the coordinated move- 
ments  in  domestic  monetary  policies  were,  therefore,  much  more 
attenuated than under fixed exchange rates.I6 Hence, we find a contin- 
ued commonality in the movements of inflation rates internationally, but 
a much greater disparity around the averages. 
Now let us turn to several puzzling questions. One is the reason for 
the differences in the year-to-year relationships estimated for money 
growth and for inflation. Our inclination is to attribute this difference 
to lags and the generally more random nature of fluctuations in money 
supply growth than in inflation rates. An additional factor that may be 
operating is the shift in the demand for money in the United States in 
the 1980s. It has very likely drastically reduced the accuracy of actual 
U.S. money growth as an indicator of excess money growth and thus 
affected  the  estimated  relationships  between  it  and  foreign  money 
growth. 
The other two puzzles have to do with  the underlying causes  of 
monetary policy behavior. For the United States, as we have pointed 
out, balance-of-payments  considerations emerge in our estimated re- 
action functions as an influence on policy over this sample period, at 
least for the Carter intervention era. These results stand in contrast to 
those reported in International  Transmission for a much more abbre- 
viated  set of  observations under floating, which exclude the Carter 
years. 
In addition, for all twenty countries taken as a whole, the data point 
to monetary growth targets apparently being chosen independently of 
their inflation consequences. This may reflect the existence of a mul- 
tiplicity of policy goals in most countries, or perhaps merely the sta- 
tistical dominance of several countries in which growth in the demand 
for money was ignored by policymakers, being viewed as of only sec- 
ondary importance. 
Notes 
1. The most often cited statements on the  subject are  Milton Friedman’s 
classic article, “The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates” (1953), and Harry G. 
Johnson’s sequel article of a decade and a half later, “The Case for Flexible 
Exchange Rates: 1969.” With regard to Friedman’s article it is  important to 232  Michael R. Darby/James R. Lothian 
note that his argument is not that a system of floating rates will  provide a 
country with complete insulation  from economic developments abroad, but 
that there will “be little of no effect through purely monetary channels” (p. 200). 
2. In the presence of the Darby (1975) effect and differential tax effects in 
different countries, the implications for real rates of the “no arbitrage profits” 
assumption become difficult  to determine. Those difficulties are beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
3. See, for example, Williamson (1983, 1985) and the list of references cited 
in the concluding chapter of the former. 
4. A potential problem with examining money growth rates alone is that the 
behavior of the real quantity of money demanded may differ among countries 
because of differing rates of real growth, differences in income elasticities, or 
differences in the behavior of the portmanteau variable. Friedman (1971), Loth- 
ian (1976), and Michael Bordo and Lars Jonung (1987) all contain discussions 
of differing demand-for-money behavior among countries. 
5. We can express the standard error of estimate, SEE, as 
SEE = [(S,  - bS,,-,)dfl”2, 
where S,  is  the standard deviation  of  nominal  money growth, S,,.p  is  the 
standard deviation of real money growth, h is the regression coefficient, and 
dfis a correction for the difference in degrees of freedom. 
Since dfis constant from one period to the next and S,n-P  should not nec- 
essarily change, we can ignore both terms. An increase in SEE in going from 
fixed to floating will, therfore, require an increase in S,,,  a decrease in b, or 
some appropriate algebraic combination of changes in the two. 
6. In a considerable  number of instances we encountered breaks in  these 
data, and in  several cases, missing observations. Breaks were corrected by 
interpolation. Publications of the OECD and the Economist Intelligence Unit 
provided most of the missing data. In the case of Portugal we omitted  1986. 
7. These standard deviations are of the individual yearly observations about 
the mean for all  countries in that year.  For example, for 1956, the first year 
within the fixed rate period, a standard deviation like the ones plotted in the 
figures is computed as 
where xu, is variable x in country i (i =  1, . . . ,  n)  in periodf (j  = 1,2)  in year 
t  (1 =  I, . . . , Tj),  and  is the mean of the observations for all n countries 
in year 1 of period  1. 
8. We have divided the exchange rate periods at 1973, the year during which 
the Bretton Woods system of fixed-rate parities broke down totally. The break 
in the behavior of most of the variables plotted in the figures actually comes 
later. Dummy variable regressions run on these standard deviations generally 
confirm this impression.  The dummy that minimized  the standard errors of 
such regressions  necessarily  maximizes the regressions  (or between-period) 
sum of  squares. This generally occurs for a  dividing line  between the two 
periods of 1976. 
A  relatively late break of this sort, moreover,  makes sense. Given an ap- 
proximate two-year lag between changes in money and in prices, the monetary 
excesses of the early 1970s would not be felt fully in prices until 1974-75.  As 
inflation neared its peak, most countries’ monetary authorities  could have been 
expected to reduce their domestic rates of monetary growth, as most in fact 233  The International Transmission of Inflation Afloat 
did. Not until  1976 or 1977, therefore, would any large divergences in policies 
among countries begin to become manifest. 
9. Using the same notation  as in  note 7, we can, for example, write  the 
standard deviation for the first (the fixed rate) period as 
n 
CC  (fil  -  f.1.)  / (n - 1))1’2, 
i= 1 
where  Xil is the mean of all of the yearly observations for country  i in period 1, 
and f,,,  is the mean of the yearly observations for all n countries in period  1. 
10. The estimates were derived from regressions for the two periods com- 
bined of country-average data for each of the periods. For each sample, we 
regressed the rate of growth of real M1 on the rate of growth of  real income 
and on a measure of the change in the cost of holding money-the  change in 
the government bond yield for the fourteen countries and the average accel- 
eration in inflation for the twenty. 
11. The one regression is a linear transformation  of  the other. The slope 
coefficient in the regression of nominal on real money growth is equal to one 
plus the slope coefficient in the regression of inflation on real money growth. 
12. Express each variable as the sum of a true value and an error: 
rn=rn*+e 
P=P*+rl 
where an asterisk  now designates a true value.  Assume that the errors are 
independent of one another and of the true values, and that all variables are 
in the form of deviations from their means. Assume that 
(C)  m*  = P (m -  PI*. 
The coefficient b in a regression of rn on (rn -  p) is 
Substituting from (c) into (d) we have: 
We  rewrite this in turn as: 
(0  b = PW  + (1 - w)X, 
where 
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The estimated coefficient is therefore a weighted average of the true coefficient 
and the ratio of the variance of the error in money growth to the sum of the 
variances of the errors in money growth and inflation. The weights are the 
share of the variance of the true value of m -  p  in the total variance (inclusive 
of the two errors) and one minus that share. 
13. For  example, the standard deviation of the yearly  U.S.  inflation  rate 
increased from 0.017 in the fixed rate period to 0.033 in the floating rate period. 
Those figures translated into sums of squared deviations  from the period means 
of 0.0048 and 0.0169, respecitvely. 
If we use these as an index and, in effect, view the regressions as reversed, 
we can calculate what a given correlation under fixed would have to increase 
to under floating to keep the standard error constant. For a fixed-rate-correlation 
coefficient of 0.50-roughly  the median for the period-the  corresponding fig- 
ure under floating rates turns out to be 0.67.  This is almost 35 percent higher 
than the initial figure and well above the actual period median. 
14. Regressions run using first differences of bond yields show higher cor- 
relations under floating  rates than under fixed. The median R2 is 0.15 in the 
floating rate case and 0.34 in the fixed rate case. For all of the countries viewed 
individually,  except Canada, for which  the R2  is  constant, we also see an 
increase under floating.  Consistent with the level results, however, standard 
errors of estimate in these regressions also generally rise. Hence, while long- 
run differences in the levels of interest rates among countries increased under 
floating, the shorter-run correspondence of their direction of movement ap- 
parently did also. See Krol (1986) and Swanson (1987) for further evidence in 
this regard. 
15. Marianne  Baxter and Alan  Stockman (1987), also using multicountry 
data, find mostly lower  correlations  between foreign and U.S. quarterly indexes 
of  industrial production  during the floating rate period  when the data are in 
the form of  logarithmic first differences, but higher correlations in a number 
of instances when the data are in the form of deviations from semilogarithmic 
trends. Since the latter are apt to be smoother series and thus more akin to 
the annual (real income) data we use, we do  not believe that there is any glaring 
contradiction between our results and theirs. 
16. Canada, Germany, and Japan provide interesting examples of how the 
links between policies actually operated. For Canada, the Bank of Canada’s 
attempts to stabilize spreads between Canadian and U.S. interest rates appears 
to have been the principal force. (See Bordo, Choudhri, and Schwartz 1987, 
and Gregory and Raynauld 1985.) 
In Germany and Japan, in contrast, examination of data for the balance of 
payments and for high-powered money indicates that intervention in the foreign 
exchange market was the major infuence. In both countries, the official set- 
tlements balance went into substantial surplus, and growth rates of high-powered 
money increased considerably in  1978. The two were in line with the much 
increased balance-of-payments deficits in 1977 and 1978, and the roughly par- 
allel acceleration  in  high-powered  money in  1978 in  the United  States. The 
strong relationship of policies in both countries to policy in the United States 
in these years is further brought out in a series of contributions of Bundesbank 
and Bank of Japan officials in Meek (1983). 
This correspondence between monetary conditions in Germany and Japan 
with those in the United  States was more episodic in nature than continual 
and, as a result, weaker than for Canada versus the United  States. As the 
annual regressions reported above indicate, the correlations of MI growth in 
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period as a whole. Other regressions that we ran using annual growth rates of 
high-powered money tell a similar story: R2’s of 0.11 for both Germany and 
Japan vs. the United States. 
Batten and Ott (1985) report results derived from an analysis of the relative 
effects of weekly U.S. M1 innovations on forward exchange rates and foreign 
interest rates consistent with this description of intercountry differences in the 
relationships with the United States. 
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Comment  Alan C.  Stockman 
Michael  Darby and James Lothian  have  written  a useful  paper pre- 
senting evidence on the international  transmission  of  inflation under 
alternative exchange  rate systems. Their evidence is consistent with 
the hypothesis that policymakers  gained  independence for monetary 
policy under floating exchange rates in the long run. They also study 
the short-run links between inflation across countries, comparing sta- 
tistical relations in pegged and floating exchange rate systems, which 
they associate with the time periods 1956-73  and 1974-86. 
Darby and Lothian first discuss long-run relations in growth rates of 
prices, nominal money, and real money across countries. They argue 
that the adoption of floating exchange rates permitted a greater degree 
of monetary independence in the long run. Darby and Lothian present 
two types of  evidence for this claim. 
First, they look at the cross-country variances of  average rates of 
growth of  prices  and  money  in  the two periods.  They find greater 
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variance across countries of average inflation and bond yields (and, in 
their larger twenty-country sample, of average nominal money growth) 
in the floating period. They also find a smaller cross-country variance 
in average real income growth and real money growth in the floating 
period.  The interpretation of  these findings  given  in  their paper  is 
straightforward: nominal money and prices were constrained for each 
country in the long run under pegged exchange rates. 
Second, Darby and Lothian show that the correlation across coun- 
tries between average nominal money growth and average real money 
growth fell substantially from the pegged to the floating period. They 
argue that this is the expected result if  pegged rates constrained mon- 
etary policy and prices in the long run, while floating exchange rates 
granted some monetary independence. Under pegged rates, an exog- 
enous increase in the nominal  money  supply cannot be sustained in 
the long run (without a devaluation), while an increase in real money 
demand requires a higher nominal money supply because the domestic 
price level is constrained by  the world  price level. Given the world 
price level, then, real and nominal money move together in the long 
run. Under floating rates, on the other hand, an increase in the nominal 
money  supply raises the price level and affects real money holdings 
only insofar as it raises expectations of inflation and nominal interest 
rates (and would be expected to reduce rather than raise real money 
demand); an exogenous increase in real money demand lowers the price 
level  without  necessarily  affecting nominal  money  supply. So under 
floating rates, the correlation between real and nominal money growth 
could be smaller than under pegged rates. 
This result does not follow unambiguously from theory. Changes in 
real money demand may be correlated across countries in the long run 
(just as seasonal changes in money demand are clearly correlated across 
countries). If  so, the correlation between the growth rates of the real 
and nominal stocks of money could be arbitrarily small under pegged 
exchange rates (because the world price level would adjust as world 
money demand changes). Similarly, the correlation  between real and 
nominal money growth could be high under floating rates if changes in 
the quantity of real money demanded are accommodated by monetary 
policy (as if, for example, the policymakers are targeting the price level 
or nominal interest rates with monetary policy). 
The long-run relationships  that Darby and Lothian seek from the 
data could perhaps be better investigated by testing for cointegration 
of nominal money and real money under pegged exchange rates, that 
is, for the existence of a common trend  in both variables.  Their ar- 
gument implies that a common trend in nominal money and real money 
exists under pegged exchange rates because, under their hypothesis, 
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about the long run allows for any arbitrary short-run behavior of nom- 
inal and real money, and the tests for cointegration also permit arbitrary 
short-run  behavior  around  the  common  trend. Their argument  also 
implies that this common trend vanished under floating rates as nations 
took advantage of  the long-run monetary independence that floating 
offered. 
Overall, there is likely to be little controversy over the conclusions 
reached in the paper about long-run relationships. One important policy 
issue that the evidence presented in  the paper is not capable of  ad- 
dressing involves the reasons for higher average inflation in the flexible 
exchange rate period. In particular, it is possible that the system of 
floating exchange rates eliminated a constraint on monetary policy that, 
other things being the same, would have kept money growth and in- 
flation lower had pegged rates been maintained. If so, the benefits from 
lower money growth and inflation would have to be weighed against 
the costs due to losses from other policies, such as greater barriers to 
international trade and financial flows that might also be associated 
with pegged exchange rates. 
The most controversial issues connected with this paper concern the 
short run.  Darby  and  Lothian argue that there was some short-run 
independence of monetary policies under pegged exchange rates. They 
cite the following evidence.  First, annual  time-series  regressions  of 
inflation in each country on inflation in the U.S. have higher standard 
errors (as well  as higher correlation coefficients) in  the floating rate 
period than in the pegged rate period. Darby and Lothian interpret this 
as a measure of short-run “slack”  in the relationships connecting na- 
tional inflation rates. The same results are obtained from time-series 
regressions of nominal or real money growth in each country on the 
corresponding U.S. variable. Darby and Lothian also show that time- 
series regressions of the growth of real income in each country on U.S. 
real income growth typically yield lower standard errors and higher 
correlations in the floating rate period. They interpret this result  as 
reflecting nonmonetary dependencies across countries that may have 
expanded with the increases in international trade and financial market 
liberalization that accompanied the floating rate period. 
One interesting issue that arises here concerns the interpretation of 
the short-run and long-run results.  Under one interpretation  of  the 
notion that countries had some degree of monetary independence in 
the short run under pegged exchange rates, a country with a pegged 
exchange rate could increase its nominal money supply and price level 
in  the short run but not in  the long run. In that case, we should see 
some intrinsic dynamics of the exchange-rate-adjusted ratio of  price 
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high  short-run  money growth  and inflation rates that exceed  world 
inflation, those experiences should typically be followed by  inflation 
rates that are lower than world inflation (or a devaluation). But there 
is evidence on exchange-rate-adjusted price ratios that suggests oth- 
erwise. There is  some evidence that  ratios of  price  indexes across 
countries, adjusted for exchange rates, are nonstationary random vari- 
ables-close to random walks-under  both exchange rate systems. This 
is consistent with temporary, serially-independent differences in infla- 
tion rates across countries under pegged exchange rates.  It suggests 
that there may have been very little scope for independent monetary 
policies and inflation, even in the short run, under pegged exchange 
rates. Factors that caused divergence of relative price levels across 
countries (and of money stocks, given real money demand) were equally 
operative in the short run and long run. Highly persistent or permanent 
changes originating in  the real  sector of  the economy could change 
equilibrium relative prices (including relative prices of nontraded goods, 
the terms of trade, and so on), and these changes would seem to be 
the most likely candidates to explain cross-country differences in the 
behavior of prices and nominal money. 
Short-run  effects  of  monetary policies are unlikely candidates to 
explain the short-run behavior of prices because one would then expect 
to see subsequent reversals in price behavior as the economy adjusted 
to the long run, and this is contrary to the random-walk evidence. It 
is true that the evidence that exchange-rate-adjusted price ratios are 
random walks is weak; they may be stationary autoregressive processes 
with a high degree of persistence, typically taking at least five to ten 
years to return halfway back to their mean values following a distur- 
bance. But this very high degree of persistence reduces the plausibility 
of explanations for cross-country differences in price behavior (under 
pegged rates) that are based on short-run effects of  money growth. 
There are many other plausible explanations. For example, some coun- 
tries may have experienced greater increases in some years in relative 
prices  of  nontraded goods; given international arbitrage in prices  of 
traded goods, this raises the domestic price level and (given real money 
demand) the nominal money stock. If changes such as these were highly 
persistent or permanent, then they could explain the evidence on the 
time-series behavior of relative international price levels. 
The result that real income growth is more highly related to U.S. 
real income growth in the recent floating rate system deserves further 
study. In recent work, Marianne Baxter and I have studied the behavior 
of some main macroeconomic and international trade variables under 
alternative exchange rate systems. We  found little evidence that the 
exchange rate system is connected with the behavior of most of these 240  Michael R. Darby/James R. Lothian 
variables, including real income growth. However, we uncovered some 
(weak) evidence that output fluctuations became more country-specific 
and less worldwide in the post-1973 period. 
One major problem faced by economists studying the effects of al- 
ternative exchange rate systems involves distinguishing effects of the 
exchange rate system per se from the effects of different time periods 
under study. This problem can be solved by using cross-sectional in- 
formation from countries that floated prior to 1973 (such as Canada) 
and from countries that maintained  pegged  rates after  1973 (which 
includes many countries, mainly LDCs) and from mixed arrangements 
such as the EMS. My casual observations suggest that further study 
of the long-run relations will support the conclusions reached by Darby 
and Lothian. The short-run problems are more difficult, as usual. 
General Discussion 
BRUNNER  said that Alan Stockman’s remarks reminded him of a study 
prepared by his group at the University of Bern. They investigated the 
response of the Swiss National Bank to changes in the Deutschemark- 
Swiss franc exchange rate, finding a systematically  asymmetric re- 
sponse pattern centered around a critical benchmark of 80 francs to 
DM100. Whenever the Deutschemark rate approached the benchmark 
and threatened to move lower, the National Bank raised the growth 
rate of the monetary base. Improvements of the Deutschemark rate 
did not systematically induce a retardation of the Swiss monetary base. 
Brunner also commented on the concept of the reaction function. 
Its formulation usually  involves a relation between  money  stock (or 
bank credit) and a selection of economic determinants presumed to 
guide policy action. This relationship, however, meshes the structure 
of  the money supply process with the response of policy variables to 
the state of the economy. It is not an informative formulation and may 
lead to false inferences. A long lag of the dependent variables behind 
the selected guide variables has generally been attributed to a recog- 
nition  lag,  when  it  actually  results  from a  misinterpretation  by  the 
authorities of their own actions. But the notion of a reaction function 
suffers from an even more fundamental flaw, at least for the U.S. A 
detailed study of Federal Reserve policymaking reveals that there is 
no such thing as a stable reaction function. Policymakers find it polit- 
ically inadvisable to tie themselves to a regular pattern. Their responses 
to various  conditions  change over time and the weights attached to 
specific aspects of the state of the economy shift. He concluded that 241  The International Transmission of Inflation Afloat 
the search for a stable reaction function is futile and yields little insight 
into our policymaking procedures. 
DARBY  responded that reaction functions do play a role in describing 
the average behavior of policymakers but not as a guide or a reference 
point.  In respanse to a point raised in Stockman’s comment, Darby 
attributed the fact that the standard deviation of industrial production 
sometimes rose in the floating rate period-whereas  he and Lothian 
found that the standard deviation of GNP tended to fall in the same 
period-to  the greater short-run  variability of  the relative  prices  of 
tradables versus nontradables. Because industrial production is largely 
the production of tradables, more variability in shifts between the trad- 
able and nontradable sectors is observed despite the fact that at the 
same time-because  there is less variation in money and output-less 
variability occurs in real GNP. 
MCCALLUM  made the point that Brunner’s view of reaction functions 
does not imply that policymakers do not have stable preferences, rather, 
it implies that they will not tell us what they are. 
BRUNNER  agreed that he does not deny stable preferences, but sug- 
gests that we need to be careful in  understanding to what the prefer- 
ences apply. In his judgment they do not apply to the usual variables 
selected (inflation, unemployment, etc.) but to more fundamental po- 
litical objectives (e.g., the range of admissible actions and the level of 
public criticism or approbation). These objectives, expressed by a util- 
ity function, yield, together with some political constraints, a shifting 
and unpredictable response to the usually emphasized variables. Ac- 
cording to him, the work by  Alex Cukierman and Allan H. Meltzer 
gets closest to the reality of the problem. 
LOTHIAN,  MELTZER,  and MCCALLUM  made  the point  with respect 
to the Federal Reserve’s reaction function that although the Fed has 
always tried to peg the federal funds rate, it has varied its target rate 
in different periods in response to different conditions. Thus, according 
to Meltzer, they responded differently when they wanted to disinflate 
in  1979 than when they  wanted to expand in  1976, or in  1986 when 
they wanted to drive down the nominal exchange rate. 
O’DRISCOLL  argued that it is not clear that there is not a set of stable 
constraints. Particularly in a fiat money regime, it is not clear that the 
central bank can resist shifting political forces. 
LAIDLER  expanded on  Stockman’s point  about  the importance  of 
distinguishing between  a break  in  the time series and a break in the 
exchange rate regime in  evaluating the correlations between nominal 
and real money balances  in  table 5.2.  According to him, the period 
1956 to 1973 was characterized by relatively low money growth, low 
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subsequent period characterized by high inflation and interest rates, 
and wide swings in real output. 
Laidler also suggested that an application of Hayek’s model of com- 
peting  monies  to central bank  behavior  in  a  flexible  exchange rate 
regime leads to the implication that market mechanisms such as cur- 
rency substitution would, over time, discipline central banks to  produce 
greater exchange rate stability. He asked whether Darby and Lothian 
observed such a tendency in their data. 
LOTHIAN  responded that their data showed no evidence of currency 
substitution  in the form of a negative correlation  between real  cash 
balances in one country and in another. He agreed with Laidler that 
central banks learn over time, but doubted if this was by the Hayekian 
mechanism.  Instead he  stressed the importance of  political  forces, 
giving as an example the disinflation of 1980. In response to Laidler’s 
comment on the break point of the data, Lothian argued that the de- 
marcation between periods chosen may have biased the case somewhat 
against their findings. 
DARBY  pointed  out that much of the increase in trade volume and 
integration of capital markets that has occurred since 1973 is regime 
related. Since the advent of floating rates, governments no longer have 
the excuse of pressure on international reserves to maintain exchange 
and capital controls. 
MELTZER  addressed the question of whether the Hume mechanism 
or some other adjustment mechanism is dominant. He argued that, in 
retrospect, both are dominant depending on the period and the nature 
of the shocks in that period. For example, the response to real shocks, 
if they were dominant, may induce an increase in productivity in coun- 
try A which  sends capital flowing to it from country B. Eventually 
country B’s income will increase in the form of  repatriated return on 
investment, but  that may  take a  very  long  time.  In  this  particular 
example, most of the adjustment is in the capital market, but for another 
kind of shock, the adjustment may occur mainly in some other market. 
Both  adjustments operate  in  different  proportions  under  different 
regimes. 
LOTHIAN  agreed  with  Meltzer.  According  to  him, the  story that 
emerges from both the tests and the more descriptive part of their 
paper is that the Humean mechanism continued to be of considerable 
importance under floating rates. 
M.  FRIEDMAN  distinguished  two  different  meanings  of  fixed  ex- 
change rates. Fixed rates resulting from unified currencies, in which 
case central banks have no role. And fixed rates that are pegged rates, 
in which case central bankers are very important. Under pegged rates, 
he stated, exchange rate problems always come up and central bankers 
are the ones to turn to when you  run into exchange rate problems. 
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better served by a fixed exchange rate regime than by a floating rate 
regime, because a fixed rate regime gives them greater independence 
from domestic political  forces. Central bankers can always point  to 
external  pressures  to  explain  why  they  cannot  accommodate  the 
politicians. 
Friedman then amplified Laidler’s point that central banks have been 
going through a very important learning process about how to live in 
a world of floating exchange rates. According to him, although there 
is evidence of learning by central banks, this does not mean that they 
do not make mistakes. Nineteen seventy-one marked the introduction 
of an historically unprecedented monetary system in the world. It was 
the first time that all countries were on a pure fiat currency standard, 
hence it is not surprising to him that it took them some time to settle 
down and figure out how to handle it. In the process, they produced 
a worldwide inflation in the 1970s. Friedman stated that his belief that 
the central banks have settled down is shown by the widespread dis- 
inflation policies in 1979, and by the reluctance that Japan and Germany 
have recently demonstrated to yield to pressures coming from the United 
States to inflate. 
BORDO  pointed  out that central banks are opposed to actually cre- 
ating unified currency areas, but at the same time they frequently en- 
gage in working out exchange rate arrangements-for  example, recent 
initiatives at policy coordination-which  will preserve their important 
role. 
STEIN  characterized a fixed exchange rate regime as one where, for 
a period of time, the exchange rate does not change, but then when it 
changes, it does so by a discrete amount. In other words, he charac- 
terized  the fixed exchange rate period  as a series of step functions. 
Under fixed rates, inflation rates can frequently diverge among coun- 
tries while exchange rates are held fixed, but then when countries find 
that their  price  levels are way out of  line,  there will  be  a  discrete 
adjustment in exchange rates. The process will then repeat itself. Stein 
asked whether continuity was better than discontinuity. 
DARBY  agreed with Stein’s characterization of the fixed rate regime. 
This was the view expressed by him, Lothian, Gandolfi, Schwartz, and 
Stockman in the International Transmission of Infiation volume. In his 
paper with Lothian, he viewed the key question as whether or not the 
fixed rate system was fundamentally different from the flexible rate pe- 
riod in terms of variability of inflation. That is, were the pegs more bind- 
ing than the current transient goals, such as they are. He viewed their 
evidence as saying that in the recent period the transient goals were much 
less binding than the pegs were previously. Although they did find large 
changes under Bretton Woods, the variance in the average rate of change 
was less. There was in fact more harmonization under the Bretton Wood 
system for nominal variables than under floating rates. This Page Intentionally Left Blank